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A FAIR USE TO REMEMBER: RESTORING
APPLICATION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE TO
STRENGTHEN COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISARM
ABUSIVE COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
Lauren Gorab*
The primary goal of copyright law is to benefit the public. By rewarding
authors with exclusive rights, such as the power to enforce copyright
infringement, copyright protection is the means through which copyright law
accomplishes this goal. Another way that copyright law pursues its goal is
through the fair use doctrine—an invaluable utilitarian limit on copyright
protection. However, fair use is, among other things, vague. The current
application of fair use as an affirmative defense magnifies the doctrine’s
problems and makes copyright law hospitable to abusive copyright litigation.
Current proposals in this area of reform target either fair use or abusive
copyright litigation. This Note targets both problems with a single solution:
applying fair use as a right. Applying fair use as a right alleviates some of
the doctrine’s inherent problems and is the best long-term solution for
eliminating abusive litigation from copyright law. As a right, fair use
protects copyright’s core values and goals, alleviates the burden on courts,
and cultivates creation. A review of the motivation behind fair use reveals
that as a right, fair use is best able to serve the purpose for which it was
designed.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law’s raison d’être is to promote the creation of new works to
benefit the public because creative activity “is vital to the well-being of
society.”1 To secure the benefit of creative works for the public and
incentivize future creation, copyright protection provides authors2 with
limited monopoly rights over their creations.3 Copyright law also pursues its
goal through the fair use doctrine, which states that certain secondary uses4
qualifying as “fair use” are not copyright infringement.5

1. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990).
2. This Note uses the terms “author” or “creator” to describe the original maker of a
copyrightable work.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Niva Elkin-Koren, The New Frontiers of User Rights,
32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 16 (2016); see also Leval, supra note 1, at 1109 (calling copyright
protection “a pragmatic measure”).
4. A “secondary use” is an unauthorized use of part or whole of a copyrighted work. For
example, a news article quoting from a published book is a secondary use of the copyrighted
work. A modern-art collage including a reproduction of a famous painting still under
copyright is also a secondary use.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16; Leval, supra note 1, at
1127; Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 273, 276–77 (2015).
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Fair use limits the exclusive rights of copyright owners.6 It embodies the
balance between private ownership and public access, and it applies across
copyright law.7 Currently, the application of fair use as an affirmative
defense magnifies the doctrine’s inherent problems and makes copyright law
hospitable to abusive copyright litigation.8 The prevalence of abusive
copyright litigation also illuminates weaknesses in copyright law.9 Abusive
copyright litigation exploits the courts, frustrates copyright protection,
weakens copyright law, and chills free speech.10
Commentators have offered proposals targeting either the fair use doctrine
or abusive copyright litigation, but these solutions approach the problems
separately.11 This Note argues that the problems are connected and therefore
proposes a single solution: applying fair use as a right. This proposal simply
changes the procedural application of fair use. Applying fair use as a right
will fix some of the problems within the doctrine itself and is also the best
long-term solution for mitigating abusive copyright litigation. In addition,
when compared to other proposals, this proposal requires the least change by
the fewest parties. As a right, fair use protects copyright’s fundamental
values and goals, alleviates the burden on courts, and cultivates creation.
Applying fair use as an affirmative defense misplaces the burden on the
defendant and makes copyright law legally and procedurally hospitable to
abusive copyright litigation.12 Instead, fair use should be applied as a right
held by users making fair use of a copyrighted work. Thus, fair use must be
considered during pleading, when the initial determination of copyright
infringement is made. Applying fair use as a right is the best approach to the
problems caused by the inherent uncertainty in the fair use doctrine and by
abusive copyright litigation because this solution reduces the potential for
abuse in copyright enforcement.

6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use.”).
7. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16; Leval, supra note 1, at 1127 (describing fair use
as a “judge-made utilitarian limit” on statutory copyright); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A.
Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2007) (calling fair use “perhaps the
most crucial policy tool for maintaining copyright’s intended balance”); see also Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fair use right
was codified to maintain the constitutionally mandated balance to ensure that the public has
access to knowledge.”).
8. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 99 (2004); see also Ned Snow, The Forgotten
Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 169 (2011).
9. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 723, 780 (2013).
10. See Elif Sonmez, Copyright Troll or Ugly Rights Holder? The Spread of Troll-Tactics
and Solutions to the Abuse of the Courts and Degradation of the Copyright Protection Scheme,
19 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 137, 138 (2015).
11. See Luke S. Curran, Note, Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line Between Legal Ransom
Letters and Defending Digital Rights: Turning Piracy into a Business Model or Protecting
Creative from Internet Lawlessness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 170, 194 (2013);
see also infra Part II.
12. See infra Part I.D.3 (explaining how abusive copyright litigation capitalizes on the
vagueness of fair use).
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I. COPYRIGHT LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND THE PLACE OF THE FAIR USE
DOCTRINE
The goal of copyright law is to provide the public with intellectual and
artistic creation. Copyright protection incentivizes creation by granting
authors limited monopoly rights over their work.13 The fair use doctrine is
also essential to the copyright mechanism because it increases access to
copyrighted works and limits the scope of copyright protection.14 Yet
weaknesses in these two features of the copyright design—the copyright
monopoly and the fair use doctrine—allow disingenuous copyright owners
to exploit copyright law.15
A. The Copyright Design
In 1790, the constitutional framers canonized the principle of copyright
protection in the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.16 The Clause’s
statement of purpose communicates copyright’s primary goals: “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”17 This statement of purpose
embodies the idea that public benefits are generated “through the creation
and publication of free expression.”18 The Clause then grants Congress the
power to achieve this goal “by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”19
Providing authors with copyright protection, and thus economic rights, is an
incentive to create and produce, which in turn generates activity and progress
in the arts and sciences for the public’s intellectual enrichment.20
The economic philosophy underlying copyright law is that the “best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
‘Science and useful Arts’” is by encouraging individual creation through
personal gain.21 Therefore, copyright law protects authors to incentivize
future creation, which then benefits the public.22 The U.S. Supreme Court
has consistently stated that copyright’s fundamental goal is securing public
benefit.23 Accordingly, copyright protection is neither an individual nor a
natural right; it derives solely from statutes and applies only when certain

13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16.
14. Leval, supra note 1, at 1110.
15. See infra Parts I.C–D.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. Id.
18. Curran, supra note 11, at 173; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. Leval, supra note 1, at 1107.
21. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
22. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
Copyright’s immediate impact is rewarding authors for their creative labor, but copyright’s
ultimate goal, through the reward-incentive, is to encourage “[the creation of useful works]
for the general public good.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
23. See, e.g., Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
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conditions are met.24 Moreover, copyright protection is limited;25 an
author’s control over his work is not absolute or perpetual.26
B. Modern Copyright Law: Protection, Rights, Remedies
The modern copyright statute is the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976
Act”).27 The 1976 Act changed several aspects of copyright law and added
§ 107, which codified the fair use doctrine.28 To be eligible for copyright
protection, a work must be original.29 Neither facts nor ideas are eligible for
copyright protection.30 Once a work receives copyright protection, the owner
has a bundle of exclusive rights concerning the work.31 An owner can also
sell or license these exclusive rights individually or collectively.32
With rights come remedies, and copyright law provides owners with
remedies for infringement of their copyrights.33 Owners may bring
infringement actions against anyone who violates any of their exclusive
rights.34 The Act provides two damages remedies: actual damages35 and
statutory damages.36 If an owner establishes that their copyright was
willfully infringed, the court may award additional statutory damages of up

24. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1108.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1107.
27. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The Act was the product of “a major legislative
reexamination of copyright doctrine.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
29. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“[O]riginality
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity . . . .” (citing The Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879))).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The idea-expression distinction—expressions of ideas are
copyrightable while ideas themselves are not—respects the First Amendment and copyright
law by allowing facts to be freely communicated “while still protecting an author’s
expression.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
31. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 139. The bundle includes the right to publish,
reproduce, adapt, distribute, display, or perform the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
32. See id. §§ 106, 201(d)(2). The divisibility of the bundle confers standing on any owner
or licensee of a right, allowing them to enforce infringement of that right. See id. “Standing”
or “standing to sue” under federal law means that a party has the “right to make a legal claim
or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). Standing requires a plaintiff to show: “(1) that the challenged conduct has caused
[him] actual injury, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of
interests meant to be regulated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id.
Here, standing means the right to bring copyright infringement claims.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
34. See id.
35. Id. § 504(b). Actual damages are any damages the copyright owner incurs due to the
infringement plus any profits the infringer earned. See Curran, supra note 11, at 174–75.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). An owner can seek statutory damages between $750 and
$30,000 per infringed work. Id.
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to $150,000.37 Copyright owners may also seek injunctions38 or request the
impounding and destruction of infringing works.39
Because authors can sell any of their exclusive rights, it is common that
the party alleging copyright infringement—enforcing infringement of an
exclusive right and seeking a remedy—is not the original author of the
work.40 An owner’s motivation for enforcing infringement of their right does
not matter.41 What does matter is that the owner’s rights “extend only to the
limits of the copyright.”42
C. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine limits the exclusive rights of copyright holders43 by
exempting users from copyright infringement if the user can show that their
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is sufficiently fair to avoid liability.44
Technically, a secondary user making “fair use” of a copyrighted work need
not obtain the owner’s permission to use the work.45 Limiting authors’
exclusive rights ensures that secondary users have access to copyrighted
Access to copyrighted materials furthers copyright’s
materials.46
fundamental goal of public enrichment by allowing users to “exercise their
rights to freedom of expression, education, and cultural participation.”47 Fair
use is intentionally flexible and highly case specific, which allows it to adapt
to a variety of copyright cases.48

37. Id. § 504(c)(2). But the court also has discretion to reduce a statutory damages award
if the infringer proves that he was not aware nor had any reason to believe that his conduct
was copyright infringement. See id.
38. Id. § 502.
39. Id. § 503.
40. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 139–40.
41. Leval, supra note 1, at 1128 (“[T]he copyright owner may sue to protect what he owns,
regardless of his motivation.”).
42. Id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Leval, supra note 1, at 1128 (“As fair use is not an infringement,
[the owner] has no power over it.”).
44. See Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 144
(2011).
45. See Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
46. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 6; Sun, supra note 44, at 144.
47. Sun, supra note 44, at 144.
48. Snow, supra note 45, at 4.
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1. History and Doctrine
Although the fair use doctrine was not codified until 1976, it was first
introduced into American copyright law in 1841.49 In Folsom v. Marsh,50
Justice Joseph Story explained that certain secondary uses of copyrighted
materials displayed such independent creation that they did not constitute
infringement.51 To evaluate this type of use, Justice Story articulated an oftcited approach to questions of fair use: “[W]e must often . . . look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”52 The
fair use doctrine continued as exclusively judge-made law until the Copyright
Act of 1976.53 Both the House and Senate reports stated that § 107 was
designed to track the preexisting judge-created fair use doctrine, “not to
change, narrow, or enlarge [fair use] in any way.”54 In Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,55 the Supreme Court cited Professor
Alan Latman’s commentary of common-law fair use to help explain the
analysis, which asks, “would the reasonable copyright owner have consented
to the use?”56
The fair use doctrine is critically important to copyright law.57 Fair use is
a fundamental policy of copyright law because it represents copyright’s
central balance between monopoly protection and public benefit.58 The

49. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); see
Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 276. Fair use appeared a century earlier in English courts of
equity. See Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (proposing “fair abridgement”).
The principle of fair use is said to be as old as copyright itself. See Matthew Sag, The
Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1410 (2011). The Supreme Court has
described fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” developed by judges. Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 448 (1984)). But see Leval, supra note 1, at 1127 (countering that fair use is a judgemade limit on statutory copyright, not the product of equity).
50. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
51. Id. at 345.
52. Id.
53. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Leval, supra note
1, at 1105; see also Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 53, 92 (2014).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975).
55. 417 U.S. 539 (1985).
56. Id. at 550 (citing ALAN LATMAN, STUDY NO. 14 FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
(March 1958), in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 1, 15 (Comm. Print 1960)).
57. Scholars unanimously agree. See, e.g., Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 273 (calling fair
use “possibly the most important doctrine in all of copyright”); Sun, supra note 44, at 127
(“Fair use is of vital importance in a free and just society.”); see also Michael J. Madison,
Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391,
392 (2005) (“The world is a better place in some small measure because fair use enables it to
be so.”).
58. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1135–36; see also Madison, supra note 57, at 392
(explaining that “fair use matters to copyright law” because it prevents copyright protection
from becoming limitless).
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doctrine protects overbroad grants of monopoly rights,59 safeguards access
to knowledge,60 has “built-in First Amendment accommodations,”61 and is
highly adaptable.62
2. 17 U.S.C. § 107: The Fair Use Factors
Fair use’s flexibility is a well-recognized strength.63 First, § 107 labels
fair use as a limitation on exclusive rights.64 It then explains that fair use of
a copyrighted work can be made for “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”65 Each fair use analysis is highly
case specific and is determined by evaluating the four factors listed in
§ 107.66 These four enumerated factors require courts to look at fair use from
all relevant angles and ask whether a finding of fair use furthers copyright’s
goals.67 Each factor represents a different consideration pertaining to the
determination of fairness, and the factors collectively help determine whether
the secondary use at issue constitutes infringement.68 The factors represent
the common-law principles that judges established to evaluate necessary
limitations on copyright infringement.69 No single factor is dispositive, and
the factors need not be weighted equally.70

59. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1109. Excessive copyright protections are problematic
because they strangle the creative process, impede referential analysis, and stifle the
development of new ideas from old ideas. See id.
60. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16–17; see, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755
F.3d 87, 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2014).
61. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see Sun, supra note 44, at 127. Fair
use “accommodates [and] encourages a wide range of freedom-promoting activities that
involve using copyrighted works for purposes such as news reporting, criticism, teaching, and
research.” Sun, supra note 44, at 127.
62. See id. at 202 (“History [shows] that fair use is a highly dynamic legal tool.”). Fair
use has evolved over time by adapting to changing technologies and social conditions. See
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 46–47 (2001); Sun, supra note 44, at 202 (“No matter how fair use
changes, what remains unchanged is its capacity to generate active responses and adaptations
to new public needs.”).
63. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540
(2009).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also id. § 106 (“Exclusive rights in copyrighted
works.”).
65. Id. § 107.
66. Id.; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985);
Snow, supra note 45, at 4.
67. Leval, supra note 1, at 1110–11.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright.”); see Snow, supra note 45, at 4 (explaining that the fair use doctrine “follows
general principles that guide the analysis of determining fairness”). The statutory factors
reflect Justice Story’s articulation. Compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), with 17 U.S.C. § 107. For further discussion, see Leval, supra note
1, at 1110–25 (comparing § 107 to Folsom).
69. Snow, supra note 45, at 4 (stating that the factors represent fair use principles
developed over two hundred years).
70. See Harper & Row, 417 U.S. at 560; see also Snow, supra note 45, at 4.
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“Factor One is the soul of fair use.”71 This first factor examines “the
purpose and character of the [secondary] use”: the degree to which the
secondary use transforms the original work, the justification for the use, and
whether the secondary use is for a commercial purpose or a nonprofit
educational purpose.72 A finding of fair use turns, in part, on the degree to
which the secondary use is “transformative,”73 how productive the use is, and
whether it uses the copyrighted material in a different way or for a different
purpose than the original.74 Compared to a nonprofit purpose, a commercial
secondary use is more likely to weigh against a finding of fair use, although
a commercial purpose alone does not defeat fair use.75
Factor two examines the nature of the copyrighted work.76 This factor
reviews the purpose of the original work and aims to protect “the incentives
of authorship” by suggesting “that certain types of copyrighted material are
more amenable to fair use than others.”77 The fair use analysis differentiates
between creative works intended for publication and private documents
never intended for publication.78 Factor two protects reasonable expectations
of creators and authors of the type of works that “copyright seeks to
encourage.”79 Thus, works intended for publication are more deserving of
protection against a finding of fair use than works intended only for private
purposes.80
The third factor examines “the amount and substantiality of the portion [of
the work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”81 Factor
three bears directly on the analysis under factor one because the portion used
must correspond to the proffered justification; the means (the selection and
quantity) must match the ends (the transformative justification).82 First, the
portion used must correspond to the justification articulated under factor one;
the means (the selection and quantity) must match the ends (the

71. Leval, supra note 1, at 1116.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1); see Snow, supra note 45, at 4.
73. Judge Pierre N. Leval of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals developed the
“transformative” requirement, finding support in early judicial opinions. See Leval, supra note
1, at 1111 (discussing Gyles v. Wilcox and Folsom v. Marsh). Judge Leval’s contribution to
the fair use analysis was a critical development in fair use jurisprudence. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (endorsing Judge Leval’s position and
emphasizing the importance of “transformativeness”).
74. Leval, supra note 1, at 1111. Examples of transformative uses include parody,
symbolism, and criticism. Id.
75. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
77. Leval, supra note 1, at 1116; see Snow, supra note 45, at 4.
78. Leval, supra note 1, at 1116–17.
79. Id. at 1122.
80. Id.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). The amount used depends on the context. For example, a
secondary use of one line from a haiku differs from a secondary use of one sentence from a
novel. Similarly, a secondary use of a single, crucial sentence from a novel differs from a
secondary use of multiple pages of inconsequential text. Leval, supra note 1, at 1123; accord
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985).
82. Leval, supra note 1, at 1123.
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transformative justification).83 In addition, factor three can help determine
the secondary use’s market impact under factor four.84 The amount of the
copyrighted work used aids in determining market impact because as the
amount of the copyrighted work taken increases, so too does the likely impact
on the owner’s market.85 Judge Pierre Leval has urged courts to determine
the importance of factor three by considering copyright’s goals by asking:
What is the use’s justification, and will it negatively impact the benefits of
authorship?86
Finally, factor four examines whether the secondary use impacts the
potential market for, or the actual value of, the original work.87 Factor four
protects the benefits of authorship in order to incentivize future creation. A
secondary use that materially interferes with the market for the original work
weighs strongly against fair use.88 However, a secondary use that does not
substantially impact the original work’s market does not automatically favor
fair use.89 Market impact must weigh against the secondary user when it
considerably weakens the incentive to create works for publication.90 Above
all else, a secondary use must be justified.91
In sum, the secondary use must stimulate productive thought and public
education without impairing the incentives for future creation.92 Most
importantly, analysis of each factor, and additional questions relevant to the
fair use inquiry, must be answered by reference to the central principles of
copyright law.93
3. Applying the Fair Use Factors
The application of fair use is a highly fact-specific process.94 Analyzing
fair use requires identifying the evidentiary facts, applying the four factors to
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1124.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012). The Supreme Court has called factor four the most
important fair use factor. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566
(1985). Judge Leval, on the other hand, suggests that the Court might have overstated the
importance of factor four. Leval, supra note 1, at 1124.
88. Id. For example, in Harper & Row, The Nation magazine published only about 300
copyrighted words from President Ford’s unpublished memoirs. 471 U.S. at 539. Yet those
words constituted “the heart of the [memoir],” id. at 565, and The Nation’s secondary use
substantially impacted the market for the original memoir and the market for the Time article
which had a contract for first publication, and therefore weighed heavily against a finding of
fair use, id. at 566–69.
89. Leval, supra note 1, at 1124 (explaining that lack of market harm does not assure “that
the secondary use is justified”).
90. Id. at 1125.
91. Id. at 1124.
92. Id. at 1110.
93. Id.
94. See id.; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)
(describing the distinctions in copyright as “very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost
evanescent”). Likewise, § 107 merely guides fair use, it does not attempt to define it and it
does not offer a rule that can be mechanically applied to decide whether a particular use is fair.
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those facts, producing inferences weighing for or against the fairness of the
secondary use, and weighing the inferences to determine whether the use is
fair.95 Consequently, no weighing of inferences in any two fair use cases
will be alike.96 Each fair use analysis is fact dependent. For example, in
2008 a video designer photographed Scream Icon, a street-art drawing, and
used a slightly altered version in a video backdrop at several concerts for the
band Green Day.97 The court rejected the artist’s infringement claims,
holding that the video backdrop was fair use because it was transformative
and did not impact the value of Scream Icon or the artist’s work in general.98
Currently, courts apply fair use as an affirmative defense, as dictated by
Supreme Court precedent.99 The Court first labeled fair use an affirmative
defense in 1985,100 reaffirmed the label in 1994,101 and solidified its position
in 2003.102 In 1992, when Congress amended § 107, it adopted the Court’s
1985 opinion by calling fair use an affirmative defense and adding that
defendants always bear the burden of proving fair use.103 Some scholars
argue that the application of fair use as an affirmative defense has profoundly
impacted how the § 107 factors are applied in practice.104
Fair use operates as an affirmative defense as follows: First, the plaintiff
must plead a prima facie case of copyright infringement, which only requires
the plaintiff to show that he owns a valid copyright and that the defendant
exercised one of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights.105 The current federal
pleading standard was articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly106 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,107 which heightened the pleading burden on plaintiffs who

See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] (Matthew
Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2018). This is also exactly what Congress intended. See H.R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 66 (1976) (explaining that the infinite number of situations and circumstances that
can arise in a case precludes establishing exact rules in § 107); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–49 n.31 (1984) (“[Congress] eschewed a rigid,
bright-line approach to fair use.”). The Court has consistently affirmed that § 107 is “not to
be simplified with bright-line rules.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577
(1994).
95. Snow, supra note 45, at 4–5.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013).
98. Id. at 1177–79.
99. See Sun, supra note 44, at 141.
100. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (finding
that the drafters of § 107 structured the statute “as an affirmative defense requiring a case-bycase analysis”).
101. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572, 590 n.20 (1994) (citing
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561, to support the proposition that “fair use is an affirmative
defense”).
102. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (calling fair use a constitutionally
required affirmative defense).
103. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 & n.3 (1992).
104. See Sun, supra note 44, at 136–37.
105. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1099 (2007).
106. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
107. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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must now show that their claims are “plausible.”108 Next, the defendant must
prove, as an affirmative defense, that his use was fair use. Under Twombly
and Iqbal, defendants, who are already required to raise and plead fair use in
their answers,109 must raise fair use in their answers and allege sufficient
facts to make fair use plausible.110 Failing to do so may cause the court to
grant a motion to strike the fair use defense.111 Judges can (and do) decide
fair use as a matter of law, which ends the case before trial.112 Allowing
judges to decide fair use as a matter of law comports with the fact that judges
invented and developed fair use.113
4. Problems in Fair Use
Because the fair use doctrine is a highly fact-specific factor test, it is
primarily criticized for offering little to no guidance in practical application.
Due to this lack of guidance, fair use is also criticized for producing varied
outcomes across cases. Another niche line of criticism identifies the
problems specifically caused by applying fair use as an affirmative defense.
The fair use doctrine’s flexibility is both a strength and a weakness.114 The
primary criticism of fair use is that it is too vague115 and, therefore, that the

108. Compare Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, with FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a). See generally RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D.
Pa. 2010) (“There is a ‘new sheriff in town’ now policing [the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure], and his name is ‘Twiqbal.’”). Many lower courts apply the standard of Twombly
and Iqbal to affirmative defenses. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?,
90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705–06 (2015).
109. A party must raise any claims or affirmative defenses in a responsive pleading (e.g.,
complaints, answers, or amended versions thereof). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1), 12(b).
110. See Loren, supra note 108, at 706; see also Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of
Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1784 (2010) (“Establishing the
answers [to the fair use inquiries] requires the fair user both to produce the necessary evidence
(even where the inquiry is speculative) and to persuade the court that her interpretation of the
evidence reflects fact (even where the inquiry is subjective).”).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
112. See Snow, supra note 45, at 9. In 2010 the Second Circuit explained that issues of
substantial similarity typically do not require discovery or fact finding because the court need
only visually compare the works. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602
F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010); see Robert T. Sherwin, Clones, Thugs, ‘n (Eventual?) Harmony:
Using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Simulate a Statutory Defamation Defense and
Make the World Safe from Copyright Bullies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 823, 858 (2015).
113. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing fair use’s common-law roots).
114. See Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of
Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1857 (2007) (describing
the “open-ended and discretionary character” of fair use as both “meritorious flexibility” and
a “main cause of its deficiencies”). In Folsom, Justice Story explained that the fact-specific
fair use inquiry could not generate “general principles applicable to all cases.” Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
115. See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 400
(2009) (calling § 107 “notoriously vague”); Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 277. Section 107
is flexible (or vague) by design. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Sun, supra note 44, at
136 (explaining the legislative intent that courts were not to apply § 107 as a bright-line rule).
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factors offer little guidance in practice.116 This vagueness manifests in a
disconnect between fair use in theory and in practice.117 As a result, fair use
outcomes are unpredictable.118 Accordingly, fair use has earned some
unflattering epithets: “‘disarray,’ ‘in bad shape,’ ‘notoriously vague,’
‘nobody knows,’ ‘great white whale of American copyright law,’ ‘protean,’
‘difficult—some say impossible—to define,’ ‘confusion,’ ‘guess and pray,’
‘mysterious,’ ‘disorderly basket of exceptions,’ ‘precarious,’ ‘nearly
impossible to predict,’ ‘as vague as possible,’ ‘more fickle than fair,’ and
‘astonishingly bad.’”119
The doctrine’s unpredictability and uncertainty potentially chill creativity
because, without guidance, potential secondary users contemplating using
copyrighted works are unable to assess their liability.120 Previous fair use
cases also offer no reliable guidance to secondary users.121 The doctrine’s
ambiguity also causes risk aversion among copiers, who would prefer to
license, settle, or refrain from using a work at all to avoid litigation.122
Because of the prohibitive costs and uncertain outcomes, potential secondary
users are vulnerable to their own self-censorship.123 In essence, potential
secondary users might refrain from creating at all, rather than risk liability.124
Commentators argue that the doctrine’s unpredictability and uncertainty
are anathema to copyright’s purpose, which is to promote the progress of

116. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 57, at 391 (“[G]enerations of scholars, judges, and
lawyers have struggled since [1939] to make sense of fair use, with little success.”); Mazzone,
supra note 115, at 395 (“Fair use is not working.”).
117. See Carroll, supra note 105, at 1122 (calling fair use critical “in brokering expressive
freedoms among first-generation authors and their successors,” but undermined in practice by
its uncertainty because “those who produce works for public consumption” are unwilling to
rely on fair use due to the high costs of “interpreting standards and the financial risks
associated with relying on fair use”); see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 7, at
1485 (arguing that, in theory, fair use should significantly limit authors’ rights because fair
use “sanctions private takings of intellectual property without requiring the payment of
compensation,” but that, in reality, fair use is “more bark than bite” because its “ability to
shield unauthorized users is greatly undermined by the uncertainty that has become the
hallmark of the doctrine”).
118. Sun, supra note 44, at 136. The U.S. Copyright Office has an online fair use index: a
searchable database of court opinions which attempts to make the principles and applications
of fair use more accessible and comprehendible. See U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index,
COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/P9TE-AGTC] (last
updated July 2018).
119. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 278–79 (footnotes omitted) (collecting quotations from
scholarship); see David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) (suggesting that Congress could have “legislated
a dartboard rather than” the § 107 factors and the result would be the same).
120. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 742–43; Carroll, supra note 105, at 1106;
Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 277–78.
121. See Carroll, supra note 105, at 1102.
122. Balganesh, supra note 9, at 743.
123. Sun, supra note 44, at 156. Self-censorship means that users give up their right to fair
use. Id.
124. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 278. The costs and burdens associated with the
uncertainty in defending fair use are demonstrated in the story of documentary filmmaker John
Else. See infra Part I.D.2.
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knowledge, because uncertainty chills creative activity.125 Consequently,
many scholars offer proposals to combat fair use’s vagueness and
uncertainty; these proposals attempt to add guidance to the doctrine by either
adjusting the fair use analysis or through more drastic changes like taking the
doctrine away from the courts.126
Another category of fair use criticism takes issue with the doctrine’s
treatment as an affirmative defense. For example, Professor Lydia Pallas
Loren argues that the placement of the burden to prove or disprove fair use
may greatly impact the outcome of litigation at various stages and that it is
misguided to place the burden of production on the defendant.127 For
example, even the Supreme Court, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,128
noted that a party raising fair use would have difficulty meeting its burden
without evidence about relevant markets.129 Because it is more difficult to
prove the absence of something than it is to prove the presence of the same
thing, the plaintiff is generally better positioned to supply relevant evidence
of market harm.130 Moreover, when raised as an affirmative defense, fair use
deters and chills free speech and expression.131 Finally, which party bears
the burden of proving or disproving fair use impacts the parties’ settlement
positions and the behavior of other potential users even before the threat of
litigation.132 The uncertainty in fair use exaggerates a defendant’s burden of
proof to the point of “ultimately dictating that the defendant loses.”133
D. Understanding Abusive Copyright Litigation
This Note examines two types of copyright-infringement enforcement,
defined together as “abusive copyright litigation.”134 The first type of
abusive enforcement behavior comes from “nonproducing entities,” while
the second type comes from “producing entities.” Both of these harm users,
the courts, and copyright law through their abusive enforcement of copyright
infringement.135 These entities are not Professor Latman’s “reasonable
copyright owner[s]” because both nonproducing and producing entities have

125. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 277–78.
126. See infra Part II.A (reviewing proposals to reform fair use).
127. Loren, supra note 108, at 691, 706–07.
128. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
129. Id. at 590; see Loren, supra note 108, at 707.
130. Loren, supra note 108, at 707.
131. Id. at 709–10 (arguing that the burden to prove fair use, and knowledge of the burden
to prove the defense, might “deter speech that would otherwise occur if the burden were
allocated differently”); see Snow, supra note 110, at 1791–92 (arguing that fair use chills
speech when treated as an affirmative defense). Furthermore, when a secondary use involves
speech, fair use essentially requires the speaker to prove he has a right to speak. See Loren,
supra note 108, at 709 (“Many fair uses involve speech activities.”); see also Snow, supra
note 110, at 1793–95.
132. See Loren, supra note 108, at 691; Snow, supra note 110, at 1791–92.
133. Snow, supra note 110, at 1791.
134. This Note examines the two types of abusive copyright litigation together because
they have similar relationships to the fair use doctrine and because they cause similar harms.
135. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 138.
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the capability and means to enforce copyrights that the “reasonable copyright
owner” might not.136
1. Nonproducing Entities
The first type of abusive copyright litigation comes from nonproducing
entities.137 Nonproducing entities can afford to unreasonably enforce
copyright infringement because it is their sole source of revenue.
Nonproducing entities intentionally abuse copyright’s enforcement
mechanisms by acquiring copyright ownership solely to enforce
infringement and threaten litigation to extract damages or force settlement.138
These entities are “nonproducing” because they do not produce
copyrightable content.139 For example, Righthaven LLC, an “enforcement
firm,” partnered with newspapers to enforce copyrights against online users,
usually “unsophisticated individuals and nonprofits,” who either fully or
partially copied news articles or photos.140 Righthaven threatened litigation
but offered to settle with infringers for an amount between $1,000 and
$5,000.141
Nonproducing entities are increasingly problematic.142 Their strategies
are technically legal under the current law, but they seek damages for
copyright infringement to generate revenue, not to deter future
infringement.143 By simply filing an action in federal court, nonproducing
136. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also LATMAN, supra note 56, at 15.
137. Nonproducing entities are also called nonpracticing or nonperforming entities. See
Balganesh, supra note 9, at 732. Colloquially, they are usually called “copyright trolls.” See
Copyright Troll, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “copyright troll” as “[a]
person, usu[ally] an entity, that acquires . . . the right to sue infringers of [a copyright]”). The
term copyright troll follows from patent law, where “nonpracticing entity” refers to “patent
trolls.” See Nonpracticing Entity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A person or
company that acquires patents with no intent to use, further develop, produce, or market the
patented invention. When a nonpracticing entity focuses on aggressively or opportunistically
enforcing the patent against alleged infringers, it is also termed (pejoratively) a patent troll.”).
This Note only discusses “nonproducing entities” in copyright.
138. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 58–59. A nonproducing entity either threatens
“litigation to force a large monetary settlement or instead proceeds to litigate its rights with
the sole objective of obtaining damages from a defendant.” Balganesh, supra note 9, at 732.
139. Nonproducing entities do not create, distribute, or use creative expression (i.e.,
copyrightable material). See id.
140. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 55–56.
141. Id. at 56. Scholars have investigated the potential benefits of nonproducing entities.
See, e.g., id. at 71–72, 75 (concluding, however, that the costs of the nonproducing-entity
business model will outweigh any potential benefits).
142. See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and the Common Law, 100 IOWA L. REV.
BULL. 77, 77 (2015); Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV.
1105, 1145 (2015). But abusive copyright litigation from nonproducing entities is also not a
new problem. In the 1870s, Thomas Wall, the world’s “first copyright troll,” obtained power
of attorney, often for deceased composers, and extracted the statutory penalty of two pounds
by threatening infringement actions for unauthorized performances of songs. Greenberg,
supra note 53, at 63.
143. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 732; Sonmez, supra note 10, at 140. Enforcing
copyright infringement solely to extract damages is diametrically antithetical to the purpose
of copyright protection. See supra Part I.A.
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entities can force internet service providers to reveal the names and addresses
of alleged infringers. The nonproducing entities then send letters threatening
to pursue statutory damages or offering to settle.144 Even defendants with
strong fair use defenses are wise to settle given the time, cost, and uncertainty
of litigation and of defending fair use.145
2. Producing Entities
The second type of abusive copyright litigation comes from producing
entities.146 Producing entities can afford to unreasonably enforce copyright
infringement because they are wealthy, smart, and influential.147 Producing
entities are very different from nonproducing entities because they create,
produce, or obtain copyrighted content for purposes other than extorting
litigation settlements.148 Producing entities aggressively enforce copyright
infringement and chill free speech by claiming excessive protection and
threatening liability.149 These entities are legitimate copyright owners, such
as record labels, mass-media companies, and television networks, with
reputations for aggressively monitoring, threatening, and enforcing both

144. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 78 (“The letter includes, or is followed with, an offer to
settle the dispute for somewhere between $1,000 and $5,000, with a frequently used $4,000
figure ‘calculated to be just below the cost of a bare-bones defense.’” (quoting Ingenuity 13
LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-CV-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May
6, 2013))); Curran, supra note 11, at 180.
145. Greenberg, supra note 53, at 56.
146. This Note refers to “producing entities” as entities that actually produce, create, or
distribute copyrightable content. In other words, the exact opposite of nonproducing entities.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Some commentators call this type of copyright
enforcement “aggressive copyright claims.” See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First Amendment,
and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 673, 677 (2003) (explaining that these
claims “aggressively test the boundaries of copyright” by pursuing claims premised on
interpreting copyright law to stretch copyright protection beyond the central goal of
prohibiting reproductions of copyrighted works and that, as a result, these claims are often
brought against secondary users who added meaningfully to the copyrighted work because
“[a]t their most extreme, aggressive copyright claims assert that almost any borrowing from a
copyrighted work constitutes actionable infringement”).
147. See Sherwin, supra note 112, at 826–31; see also Sun, supra note 44, at 160 (arguing
that copyright law is meant to “promote and protect the public welfare,” but that the legislature
is able to alter copyright law from the “public welfare-oriented” approach “into a copyright
holder-centric lawmaking process,” offering the recent expansion in copyright protection—
which catered to corporate interests by increasing control over knowledge and information—
as an example of the heavy influence of “copyright-based conglomerates”). Thus, Haochen
Sun argues that “the public at large has failed to have its concerns voiced in the copyright
legislative process or to have them seriously scrutinized by legislators,” partially because
legislatures focus on individual interests of copyright holders and “pay little attention to the
need for defending the public’s collective interests in knowledge and information contained
in copyrighted works.” Sun, supra note 44, at 160.
148. See Sherwin, supra note 112, at 832; see also Greenberg, supra note 53, at 59.
149. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 434
(2007) (describing the chilling effect on fair use expression as “well-documented” and
“exacerbated by the tendency of copyright owners to take advantage of the uncertainty to
pursue aggressive copyright claims”).
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legitimate and nominal copyright infringement.150 Producing entities
frequently demand large payments “for conduct that either constitutes fair
use or, even if infringing, does no harm to (and in many cases benefits) the
value of” the producing entity’s copyrights.151 Producing entities use
litigation or the threat of litigation to “snuff out . . . fair use.”152 This type of
abusive copyright litigation harms successful operation of the fair use
doctrine because even clear fair uses (and therefore future creations) are
discouraged by threat of heavy enforcement by big companies.153
For example, in 1990, documentary filmmaker John Else shot a scene
backstage at the San Francisco Opera, which included a four-and-a-halfsecond clip of The Simpsons playing on a television in the corner.154 When
Else requested approval to include the scene in his film, Fox, the parent
company, sought a $10,000 licensing fee to use The Simpsons clip.155 Else
could not afford the fee and replaced the clip in his film.156 But why did Else
not assert fair use? Else consulted a lawyer who told him that his use was
fair use but advised him that asserting fair use was futile because Fox would
“depose and litigate [him] within an inch of [his] life.”157
3. The Causes and Effects of Abusive Copyright Litigation
Several weaknesses in copyright law facilitate both types of abusive
copyright litigation.158 First, the divisibility of exclusive rights under the
150. See Sherwin, supra note 112, at 825, 832, 864 (calling these sophisticated entities
“copyright thugs” and bullies with track records of using the courts and the threat of litigation
to get their way).
151. Id. at 832 (associating this behavior with Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss’s “‘if value,
then right’ theory of intellectual property: [i]f value exists, then someone must have a right to
that value, and that value will be extracted no matter what” (quoting Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990))).
152. Sherwin, supra note 112, at 864.
153. See id. at 826–32 (describing stories of people bullied out of fair uses); see also Sun,
supra note 44, at 157–58 (explaining that many copyright owners use aggressive litigation
strategies to deter the public from asserting its fair use right and that many copyright holders
take advantage of the user’s burden to prove fair use by bringing infringement actions even in
cases of strong fair use, doing so hoping “that the user would refrain from the use rather than
spend resources in his defense”).
154. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 95–96.
155. Id. at 96–97. Fox is a producing entity because it owns the copyright to The Simpsons
for reasons other than to generate revenue by enforcing infringement.
156. Id. at 97 (describing the situation as Else not having the “money to buy the right to
replay what was playing on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera”).
157. Id. at 98–99. Professor Lessig explains that when lawyers hear Else’s story their
immediate response is “fair use.” Id. at 97. Else gave four reasons why he could not “rely on
[fair use] in any concrete way”: network-mandated insurance, the uncertainty of defending
fair use, the futility of opposing Fox, and film deadlines and budget. Id. at 98–99.
158. Balganesh, supra note 9, at 738 (finding it “surprising” that it took almost thirty years
for copyright trolls to emerge, and unsurprising that when they did, “courts and defendants
had few mechanisms” to curb them); see id. at 726 (“[C]opyright law has long enabled
behavior that is only today pejoratively described as ‘trolling.’”); see also Greenberg, supra
note 53, at 61 (noting that nonproducing entities rely “on several provisions of copyright law
that are vulnerable to exploitation”).
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Copyright Act of 1976 confers standing to enforce infringement on any
owner or licensee.159 Second, exploitative revenue-driven copyright
enforcement is possible because copyright law functions on economic
incentives.160 Nonproducing entities take advantage of the monopoly but are
not incentivized to create—in fact, they do not create at all.161 Finally,
abusive copyright litigation is possible in part because of the uncertainty in
the fair use doctrine.162 The inherent uncertainty causes many would-be
users—unable to determine whether their use would qualify as fair use—to
refrain from creating at all.163 Thus, fair use’s vagueness facilitates abusive
litigation strategies from entities who are aware of the impact of this
vagueness on risk-averse users.164 These strategies harm copyright law.
Abusive copyright litigation contravenes copyright’s central goals, deters
future creation, chills free speech, and burdens courts.165 Many users decide
to not make fair use of copyrighted works because of the “visible coercion”
that a copyright owner might enforce infringement against them, which is, in
part, the result of many copyright owners who exaggerate the scope of their
rights to prevent users from making fair uses of their works.166 When the
costs attending the incentive to create are detached from the costs to enforce
against infringement, copyright’s balance is disrupted.167 This coercion also
extends to the public at large.168
159. Balganesh, supra note 9, at 726–27 (explaining that the Act recognized multiple
ownerships of a single work, which allows “each owner to hold a narrowly defined and limited
set of rights”).
160. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 138.
161. See Curran, supra note 11, at 175–76. In addition, the sheer volume of copyrights
lacking any commercial value, and the fact that statutory damages for infringement can
overcompensate owners of valueless copyrights, further exacerbates the potential for abuse.
See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 62.
162. See Sun, supra note 44, at 158.
163. See id. (“Users become afraid of being sued because of the significant time, energy,
and financial cost of litigation.”).
164. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 742 (illustrating how the fair use doctrine was useless
to defendants sued by Righthaven, and how the doctrine facilitated Righthaven’s strategy);
see also Sun, supra note 44, at 157 (explaining the opportunity for abusive litigation strategy
because copyright holders take “advantage of the user’s burden to prove fair use” and often
bring claims against users with strong fair use defenses).
165. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 55 (explaining that abusive copyright litigation
“threatens to impose heavy costs on society, particularly by chilling speech and discouraging
innovation”); Sonmez, supra note 10, at 149–50. Nonproducing entities disrupt the copyright
mechanism by exploiting the incentives for authorship without actually “contributing to the
creative works market.” Greenberg, supra note 53, at 57 n.15. This practice also discourages
future creators. See id.
166. See Sun, supra note 44, at 157–59 (explaining that publishers often do this through
notices in books, or by stating that users may only use a certain limited number of lines, and
that publishers “have turned a blind eye to the fair use doctrine”).
167. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 140 (“[W]hen the incentive and the cost to create a work
are separated from the right to prosecute infringement of the work, there is no counterbalance
to whether a copyright holder should prosecute the infringement. If exacting statutory
penalties for infringement comes with little cost . . . then prosecuting every instance of
infringement, even every potential infringement, becomes highly rewarding for the entity that
holds the right to sue for it.”); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
168. See Sun, supra note 44, at 158–59.
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II. ISOLATED SOLUTIONS TO CONNECTED PROBLEMS: REFORMS TARGET
EITHER FAIR USE OR ABUSIVE COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
This Note highlights two distinct but connected problems facing modern
copyright law: the fair use doctrine and abusive copyright litigation. Thus
far, proposals for reform separately target one or the other. A review of these
proposals reveals that both approaches recommend significant changes or
involve new parties. This Part first discusses a variety of proposed reforms
to fair use and then explains some of the proposed approaches to dealing with
abusive copyright litigation.
A. The Current State of Fair Use Reform
In 1939, the Second Circuit called the fair use doctrine “the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”169 Current scholarship suggests
that fair use is not any less troublesome today.170 The wealth of scholarship
targeted at strengthening the doctrine is unsurprising given the importance of
fair use to copyright law.171 A common trend among reform proposals is the
disconnect between fair use in theory and in practice.172 The first category
of fair use reform focuses on reform through judges and the courts by
targeting the way judges apply the doctrine. This category is standards
driven.173 The second category focuses on reform in the legislative or
administrative realm. This category is rules driven.174 There is also a third
category of reform which argues that the problem is the characterization of
fair use as an affirmative defense.
Proponents of judge- and court-focused reform argue that the courts “are
the most natural venue for fair use reform” because judges created and
developed fair use.175 One commentator says, put simply, that fair use is
safer in judges’ hands because they are most likely to guard it.176 Judge- and
court-focused proposals also argue that the federal courts are the best place

169. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
170. See Sun, supra note 44, at 136.
171. See Samuelson, supra note 63, at 2540 (noting the common criticisms of fair use,
including the unpredictability accompanying the “fact-intensive, case-by-case nature” of the
analysis and the lack of consensus among judges on fair use’s underlying principles).
172. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 99. Professor Lessig argues that fair use “has the right
aim” but that “practice has defeated the aim” because fair use cannot function properly. Id.
The theory—“fair use means you need no permission”—“supports free culture and insulates
against a permission culture.” Id. The practice—a combination of fair use’s “fuzzy lines” and
“the extraordinary liability if [the] lines are crossed”—“means that the effective fair use for
many types of creators is slight.” Id.
173. See Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 280–82.
174. See id. at 282. However, Michael Carroll’s proposal to create a “Fair Use Board” is
an exception to the rule-driven categorization because Carroll rejects a “rule-like” approach
to fair use. Carroll, supra note 105, at 1090–92.
175. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 322 (noting that judges “gave us fair use in the first
place”); see supra Part I.C.1 (discussing fair use’s common-law history).
176. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 341 (“At the very least, [judges] will not do any worse
than Congress.”).
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to reform copyright law.177 They note that courts are a better place to reform
fair use because legislative reform through Congress is unrealistic.178
Congress, they argue, will not welcome fair use reform.179 Judicial proposals
to reform fair use include using “policy-relevant clusters” to supplement the
four-factor analysis;180 applying a double standard of review and one-sided
application on summary judgment favoring defendants;181 and encouraging
courts to consider additional factors beyond the four listed in § 107.182
The second set of reforms require congressional action.183 These
proposals argue that rules and administrative agencies can better guide
secondary users.184 They also argue that courts are slow to change whereas
Congress can make changes in response to specific problems.185 Legislative
and administrative proposals include rewriting § 107;186 creating a new
administrative agency to handle fair use;187 establishing fair use harbors;188

177. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(interpreting copyright law to accomplish copyright reform); Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright
Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 766 (2013) (book review) (explaining that
copyright reform is possible without congressional input and that fair use reform “would
involve judicial interpretation of rules that the copyright statute either does not address or that
Congress has seemingly chosen to leave to common law interpretation”); Shahshahani, supra
note 5, at 274 (“[F]ederal courts are more hospitable than Congress to pro-user fair use reform,
and that doctrinal scholarship is more fruitful than proposing ideal-type legislation.”).
178. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 274, 319 (analyzing the political economy of copyright
legislation and calling proposals requiring congressional action to limit copyright owners’
power “unrealistic”); see id. at 312–13 (arguing that recent fair use legislation demonstrates
that “Congress is in no way inclined to support legislation that would strengthen fair use or
otherwise improve the position of users and second-generation creators vis-à-vis content
owners”).
179. Id. at 319 (arguing that evidence shows “that if Congress acts at all, it would likely be
to increase the power of copyrightholders vis-à-vis users and second-generation creators,” and
that any congressional reform of fair use would be “either nonexistent or counterproductive”).
180. See Samuelson, supra note 63, at 2541–43 (proposing to complement the fair use
analysis with common patterns in fair use case law which will help predict whether a particular
use is likely to be fair use).
181. See Snow, supra note 45, at 2–3, 46 (urging courts to construe fair use as a question
of fact for the jury, to grant fair use as a matter of law in limited circumstances, and to grant
summary judgment only in favor of fair users).
182. See Samuelson, supra note 63, at 2540–41 (listing proposed additional factors, such
as “the likelihood of market failure, the plaintiff’s rationale for insisting [on a license], chilling
effects on free speech, chilling effects on innovation, the impact of network effects, whether
the defendant’s use was reasonable and customary in her field of endeavor, [the age of the
work], distributive values, and even the fairness of the use” (footnotes omitted)).
183. See Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 274.
184. See id. at 274, 280.
185. See Madison, supra note 57, at 395.
186. See id. at 396–97 (proposing to rewrite § 107 to address its “emptiness”).
187. See Mazzone, supra note 115, at 399, 412–37 (proposing to regulate fair use through
an administrative agency which would enforce legislation, issue regulations, bring
enforcement actions, and adjudicate fair use disputes through administrative law judges).
188. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 7, at 1488, 1508–18 (proposing the
replacement of the fair use standard with rules called “fair use harbors,” which declare certain
uses presumptively legal, providing users with certainty). For example, any literary work
containing more than one hundred words could be copied without permission. Id. at 1511.
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and creating a “Fair Use Board” within the U.S. Copyright Office and
granting it the power to declare a particular use fair use.189
The third category of fair use reform proposes removing fair use’s
affirmative defense label. This category argues that fair use should neither
be labeled nor applied as an affirmative defense. Instead, these proposals
argue that fair use should be considered either a mere defense,190 or as an
individual,191 user,192 or collective user right.193
In support, proponents of this approach argue that treating fair use as an
affirmative defense “reduces users’ right to fair use to ‘the right to hire a
lawyer to defend [one’s] right to create.’”194 First, because the plaintiff’s
initial burden is minimal, fair use as an affirmative defense prematurely shifts
the burden to the defendant.195 Second, the application of fair use as an
affirmative defense increases the costs “for the public to exercise its fair use
right.”196 Third, the modern pleading standard intensifies defendants’
burden, making a fair use defense procedurally and financially prohibitive,
easily costing six figures in attorney’s fees.197 Because of the uncertainty,
costs, and time needed to defend fair use, many defendants, even those with
strong fair use claims, are essentially forced to settle.198 This reality calls
into question “whether a user’s fair use right can still be adequately
protected.”199 Finally, the heightened First Amendment concerns associated
with treating fair use as an affirmative defense further support “treating fair
use as part of the inquiry into infringement [and] not as a separate inquiry to
be undertaken after the plaintiff has demonstrated more than de minimis
copying.”200

189. See Carroll, supra note 105, at 1090–91, 1123, 1148 (proposing a Fair Use Board
within the U.S. Copyright Office to decide fair use petitions).
190. See Loren, supra note 108, at 688, 699 (advocating for fair use as “a mere defense that
shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights” and advising the Supreme Court to reconsider
and reject treating fair use as an affirmative defense). Under this approach, the pleading
requirement disappears, “an omission of the defense from the answer would not preclude
consideration of the doctrine by the court,” and, most significantly, the four factors in § 107
“would become part of the analysis of whether or not the defendant’s actions constitute[d] an
infringement.” Id. at 711.
191. See generally Snow, supra note 45 (advocating fair use as a right).
192. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 4, 36–39 (following examples in Israel and Canada
and advocating a user-rights approach to fair use).
193. See Sun, supra note 44, at 130 (defining fair use as a “collective right held by the
public to facilitate and enhance participation in communicative actions”).
194. Id. at 156 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting LESSIG, supra note 8, at
187).
195. See Loren, supra note 108, at 688 (explaining that the burden shifts to the defendant
“with little needed from the plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case of infringement, thus
opening the door to the wide range of remedies permissible under the Copyright Act”).
196. Sun, supra note 44, at 156.
197. Loren, supra note 108, at 688; Sun, supra note 44, at 155.
198. See Sun, supra note 44, at 156; see also LESSIG, supra note 8, at 187.
199. Sun, supra note 44, at 156.
200. Loren, supra note 108, at 710; see Snow, supra note 8, at 137 (tracing the history of
fair use “from a speech right that defined the contours of copyright to an exception that excuses
infringement”); Sun, supra note 44, at 156.
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Advocates of considering fair use as a right, or as a mere, nonaffirmative
defense, offer several sources of support. First, scholars argue that this
conception is supported by fair use’s history and that fair use has long been
used to protect the rights of fair users.201 Second, they highlight the
interaction between § 107 and § 106 (which sets forth the exclusive rights of
copyright owners) to suggest that fair use should not operate as an affirmative
defense; § 106 explains that a copyright owner’s rights are subject to § 107
and § 107 specifies that it applies notwithstanding § 106.202 Furthermore,
reading fair use as a right also makes sense procedurally both from a
historical perspective (as this reflects how judges applied fair use203) and
currently because the party seeking relief typically bears the burden of
persuasion.204 Third, the legislative history of the 1976 Act did not label fair
use as an affirmative defense and did not intend to place the burden of
proving fair use on the defendant.205 Commentators argue that the Campbell
Court was wrong to cite the House report on the 1992 amendments to the
Copyright Act to support labeling fair use an affirmative defense because the
report is not authoritative with respect to the 1976 Act.206 Finally, there is
procedural support against treating fair use as an affirmative defense.207
Judges have also opined on the proper treatment of fair use. For example,
in 2001 the Eleventh Circuit began a fair use analysis by arguing in a footnote
that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act,
and not a mere affirmative defense, pointing out that this view comported
with the Act’s definition of fair use because fair use is “not a violation of
copyright.”208 In 2004, Judge Dennis Jacobs on the Second Circuit explained
201. Snow, supra note 8, at 137, 169 (“Treating fair use as an affirmative defense, courts
require fair users to demonstrate that their use should be protected. . . . Compared to its past
status as a right, fair use has weakened significantly.” (footnotes omitted)); Sun, supra note
44, at 156.
202. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (2012); Loren, supra note 108, at 697–98; see also Snow,
supra note 8, at 164.
203. See Snow, supra note 8, at 142–55.
204. See Loren, supra note 108, at 691, 697, 705–09; see also Snow, supra note 8, at 164.
205. See Loren, supra note 108, at 688, 699–702, 711; see also id. at 685 (“[T]he legislative
history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history
explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not intend fair use to be an
affirmative defense.”); Snow, supra note 8, at 162, 165–66.
206. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 108, at 703–04, 711 (arguing that the legislative history
intended fair use to evolve to “address new uses on a case-by-case basis,” and that it did not
permit the Court to “fundamentally alter the nature” of the fair use doctrine because it was
improper to treat fair use as “requiring the defendant [to] bear the burden of proof concerning
important factors that inform” fair use (i.e., the evaluation of whether the defendant’s conduct
was unlawful)).
207. See Snow, supra note 8, at 165–66 (arguing that, because it is easier for the copyright
holder to satisfy the burden of production, that burden should lie with the plaintiff and not the
defendant); see also Loren, supra note 108, at 691 (“Given that the prima facie case of
infringement already requires the plaintiff demonstrate that the copying by the defendant was
‘improper,’ it seems that whether a use is fair or not would constitute a necessary or extrinsic
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Further, . . . the copyright owner often has better
access to relevant evidence on the fair use factors.”).
208. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996)). In Bateman,
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that fair use does not exist by tolerance; instead it is “a right—codified in
§ 107 and recognized since shortly after the Statute of Anne [of 1709].”209
B. Solutions to Abusive Copyright Litigation
To combat abusive copyright litigation, scholars and judges have offered
solutions to thwart the “disingenuous efforts of various trolls by promoting
accountability in copyright enforcement while restoring the framers’ original
intent to the Copyright Act.”210 Like proposals to reform fair use, proposals
to quell abusive copyright litigation focus on either judicial solutions or
legislative solutions.211
Proponents of targeting abusive copyright litigation through legislation
argue that Congress is best positioned for a long-term solution and that
congressional action provides uniform and systematic legal change to wholly
disrupt the nonproducing entity business model.212 These proposals also note
that Congress has other constitutional powers regarding copyright213 and that
the Supreme Court is deferential to Congress’s copyright decisions.214 Two
common approaches are limiting statutory damages215 and denying
joinder.216
In the courts, one popular procedural tactic against abusive copyright
litigation is Rule 11 sanctions.217 Defendants and courts can use sanctions
to threaten nonproducing entities and ensure that they only file claims against
actual infringement, or not at all.218 Because litigation is a nonproducing
entity’s sole source of revenue, the threat and use of sanctions is likely to
have a meaningful impact on nonproducing entities.219 Increasing the use of
sanctions can also deter other copyright owners from using abusive tactics.220
Courts are increasingly open to punishing nonproducing entities’ litigation

Judge Stanley Birch stated that, in his opinion, fair use is better and more logically viewed as
a right granted by the 1976 Act because under the Act fair use is never infringement, so it need
not be excused. 79 F.3d at 1542 n.22.
209. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring).
210. Curran, supra note 11, at 194.
211. Most proposals target copyright “trolling.” See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
212. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156–57 (“[C]ourts should not be responsible for tracking
and managing trolling’s future incarnations.”).
213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
214. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (stating that the Court was not
at liberty to second-guess Congress in matters of copyright policy); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
215. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 9, at 736–39.
216. See, e.g., id. at 733; Sag, supra note 142, at 1141; Curran, supra note 11, at 201.
217. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11. An attorney can be sanctioned
for violating the pleading requirements under Rule 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c).
218. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 155–56.
219. See id.
220. Gregory S. Mortenson, Note, BitTorrent Copyright Trolling: A Pragmatic Proposal
for a Systemic Problem, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1105, 1134 (2013). Sanctions also generate
revenue for courts. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156.
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tactics.221 For example, the court in Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–
16,222 warned that if the plaintiff could not sustain their claims, the
defendants would have adequate remedies to recover their litigation expenses
or damages like Rule 11 sanctions.223 Importantly, the Supreme Court has
upheld Rule 11 sanctions in a copyright infringement case.224 In Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,225 the Court upheld
the district court’s award of sanctions against the plaintiff and its attorney,
whose claim lacked any evidentiary support of copyright infringement.226 In
upholding the sanctions, the Court held that “Rule 11 imposes an objective
standard of reasonable inquiry on represented parties who sign papers or
pleadings.”227
The several examples of judges crafting their own solutions to abusive
copyright litigation further support targeting the problem through courts. In
2010, a Nevada district court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—
alleging fair use—against Righthaven.228 After analyzing the fair use
factors, the court concluded that the defendant’s use was fair use because it
was informational, used “only the first eight sentences of a thirty sentence
news article,” and that the use was unlikely to impact the market for the
original work.229 In 2011, thanks again to the District of Nevada, Righthaven
was ordered to show cause why it should not be sanctioned for its flagrant
misrepresentation to the court.230
III. KILL TWO COPYWRONGS WITH ONE RIGHT
Thus far, scholars have separately targeted the two problems outlined in
Part II—the fair use doctrine’s uncertainty and abusive copyright litigation.
This Note argues, however, that the problems are connected and should be
solved together. John Else’s story demonstrates why. Despite knowing that
his clip was likely fair use, Else also knew he could not actually rely on the
fair use doctrine to quickly excuse him from liability.231 Thus, Else’s story
demonstrates how even secondary users who are confident that their use is
fair use are still deterred from creating because of the uncertainty of asserting
the affirmative defense. Moreover, Fox’s ability to request a $10,000
licensing fee for the clip is related to the fair use burden because if Else
needed the scene or had $10,000 to spare, the abusive outcome in his story
221. See COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 3:15 (2d ed. 2017) (“[C]ourts are losing
patience with ‘copyright trolls.’”).
222. 902 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
223. Id. at 702–03.
224. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 534–35 (1991).
225. 498 U.S. 533.
226. Id. at 554.
227. Id.
228. Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL
4115413, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010).
229. Id. at *2.
230. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 978–79
(D. Nev. 2011).
231. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 98–99; see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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would have been an extracted settlement rather than what it was—the chilling
and discouraging of creative activity.
Fair use reform has a long history but no conclusive solution. Instead of
targeting the analysis, a solution should focus on the application. This
proposal substantially and positively impacts defendants and fair users and
minimally impacts legitimate copyright owners. Placing a higher burden on
bringing infringement actions decreases the incentive to litigate abusively.
There are several benefits of this proposal. First, it requires less change than
other proposals and primarily impacts the party first pleading fair use. Other
solutions propose drastic change or require government and congressional
action, or ask judges to modify their approach to fair use.232 Second, this
proposal still allows other proposals to be tested within the fair use analysis.
This Note’s proposal does not fix every problem, and although other
solutions may still be necessary, this proposal targets the problem at its core
while still enabling other proposals to be tested simultaneously.
This Note suggests that the best way to kill two “copywrongs”—the fair
use doctrine and abusive copyright litigation—is with the one “right” of fair
use. Applying fair use as a right will alleviate some of the doctrine’s
problems and mitigate abusive litigation all while simultaneously protecting
the courts and users by eliminating many of the major legal and procedural
barriers. Under this proposal, abusive copyright litigation will decline and
hopefully cease. Part III.A explains the historical and practical feasibility of
this solution. Then Part III.B discusses the practical impact of the solution
and why applying fair use as a right can have the specific and desirable
impact of decreasing abusive copyright litigation.
A. Fair Use Is, and Must Be, a Right
Treating fair use as a right is the best way to limit using the doctrine for
abusive copyright litigation. Several of the criticisms and problems currently
attributed to fair use are minimized or eliminated by treating fair use as a
right. So far, fair use is the best way to carry out copyright’s goals, which is
why the doctrine itself should not be changed. In other words, this proposal
seeks to merely change fair use’s label from “affirmative defense” to “right.”
Treating fair use as a right is supported both historically and
conceptually.233 The legislative history, text of § 107, and actual practice
point to conceptualizing fair use as a right or, at the very least, not an
affirmative defense.234 Unlike other proposals, this Note offers a solution
that requires the least change and preserves judges’ control over fair use.
This proposal also maintains fair use’s flexibility and applicability across
copyright cases. Fair use should remain in the hands of judges because
judges invented, developed, and know how to apply the doctrine.235 This
proposal does not increase judges’ tasks, and they might even appreciate
232.
233.
234.
235.

See generally supra Part II.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
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analyzing fair use in fewer cases.236 Many of the common criticisms of and
problems with the fair use doctrine are minimized or eliminated by treating
fair use as a right: it offers users and defendants more certainty and thus
chills free speech less often;237 the burden is on the party in the better position
to plead;238 and there will be fewer forced settlements.239 In addition, other
proposals, for example judicial solutions to abusive copyright litigation,
solve only one aspect of what is clearly a connected problem.240
This proposal cannot eliminate every inherent uncertainty accompanying
fair use, but it can provide secondary users and defendants with more
certainty because plaintiffs must plead that the use was not fair, which gives
defendants an idea of their liability. Potential secondary users will be less
deterred when deciding to create given the increased certainty of not being
found liable if they have a strong fair use case, because plaintiffs’ minimal
burden will deter filing claims against strong cases of fair use. The current
conception of fair use makes it too difficult for defendants asserting fair use
to successfully defend it or, more specifically, to show fair use early in the
litigation process.241 By its very nature, fair use necessitates a fact-intensive
inquiry. Yet not every case deserves the time required to apply fair use.
Under this proposal, part of the time and expense pleading fair use is now
transferred to the party bringing the claim. Defendants with stronger fair use
claims have greater certainty that the case will not be brought or can be
dismissed earlier, so defendants will not be forced to incur the costs of
litigation and will not be forced to settle or be deterred from creating.
B. Litigating—or Hopefully Not—the Right of Fair Use
Fair use should be considered and decided as early as possible in litigation
and should not be used as a catalyst for abusive copyright litigation. This
section will demonstrate the positive impact and lack of downsides of this
proposal. First, it is worth noting the different desired outcomes for
nonproducing and producing entities. This proposal seeks to eliminate
claims brought by nonproducing entities entirely because they are wholly
antithetical to copyright law. But eliminating claims brought by producing
entities would be neither a realistic nor a desirable outcome. Producing
entities are essential to copyright law; they often protect authors who could
not create commercially or distribute without the assistance of a large
producing entity. For example, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) can still protect artists by helping them monitor and enforce

236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See Snow, supra note 110, at 1798 (arguing that placing the burden of proving fair
use on the defendant makes no legal sense, especially compared with the strong interest in
protecting speech).
238. See id.
239. See supra Part I.C.4.
240. See supra Part II.B.
241. See supra Part II.A.
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legitimate copyright claims.242 This proposal seeks only to remove or
decrease the incentive for producing entities to file abusive copyright
litigation by slightly increasing their burden. The impact on producing
entities should be minimal because infringement actions against strong fair
use cases should almost never be brought. More importantly, would-be
secondary users should neither be deterred from creating nor fear the overly
litigious power of producing entities.
Treating fair use as a right will minimize abusive copyright litigation at
several stages. First, abusive copyright litigation will decrease at the
pleading stage. Second, treating fair use as a right makes other procedural
devices available during litigation, like Rule 11 sanctions, and summary
judgment. Finally, even before a case is filed, treating fair use as a right
removes the incentive to file cases where the alleged infringement has a
strong fair use argument. Taken together, treating fair use as a right will help
foster a culture where would-be secondary users are not deterred from
creating by uncertain fears of liability or the threat of abusive enforcement.
1. Pleading Fair Use
This proposal positively impacts three main aspects of pleading fair use:
the party who must plead the fair use analysis, the standard by which they
must plead it, and the consequences for failing to state a claim. Even minimal
burdens deter abusive copyright litigation. For example, a complaint cannot
use boilerplate language.243 If fair use is a right, then the burden to plead that
a secondary use is not fair use should fall on the plaintiff bringing the alleged
infringement claim. To plead a plausible infringement claim, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant’s use is plausibly not fair use. Thus, fair use is
treated as part of the initial inquiry into infringement because it is an aspect
of the overall consideration of whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s
copyright. For example, the threat of a potential infringement action by Fox
would not have had the same deterrent effect on John Else, because Fox, not
Else, would have borne the initial burden of plausibly pleading that there was
not fair use to state its claim of infringement.244
This proposal does not prohibit legitimate copyright owners from
enforcing infringement of their work because the owner need only plausibly
plead that the infringing work is not fair use. The stakes for not considering
fair use at the pleading stage will hopefully be high enough to deter abusive
claims because the risks of failing to do so include sanctions and a loss of

242. See supra Part I.D.2. The RIAA qualifies as a producing entity because it represents
recording industry distributors whose business is copyright licensing, not generating revenue
primarily from litigation. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 60; see also About RIAA, RIAA,
http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php [https://perma.cc/3JY3-BCKE] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
243. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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credibility with the judge. It is in the claimant’s and his lawyer’s best
interests to make a good-faith showing of the fair use factors.245
Because pleading copyright infringement was already a low bar, Twombly
and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard currently puts an increased burden
on defendants asserting fair use, while the rationale for the pleading standard
does not have the same positive impact on plaintiffs in copyright
infringement cases.246 This is especially true in fair use cases because the
burden to plead prima facie copyright infringement is low.247 However, by
applying fair use as a right, the heightened pleading standard can function
fairly. The plaintiff must still make a prima facie showing of copyright
infringement and must plausibly plead that the defendant’s alleged
infringement is not fair use; the plaintiff is already in the best position to
make the initial showing that a defendant’s use is not fair.248 And even if an
abusive copyright litigation case is filed, it will still be easier to dismiss
earlier using a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.249 Motions to dismiss for failure to
state a copyright infringement claim—for failure to plausibly plead that
defendant’s use was not fair use—would not unduly burden legitimate
plaintiffs.250
2. Rule 11 Sanctions
Under the conception of fair use as a right, when an attorney must affirm
that he has filed a legitimate claim, he can only do so after considering
whether the use was fair use. Courts and defendants should use Rule 11
sanctions to threaten known nonproducing entities because sanctions will be
most effective against the nonproducing-entity business model.251 Because
nonproducing entities derive revenue solely from litigation or threatening
litigation, the risk of Rule 11 sanctions for failure to disprove fair use would

245. For an example of a judge barring any cases from being filed, see Ernesto, Judge
Threatens to Bar ‘Copyright Troll’ Cases over Lacking IP-Location Evidence, TORRENT
FREAK (May 12, 2017), https://torrentfreak.com/judge-threatens-to-bar-copyright-troll-casesover-lacking-ip-location-evidence-170212/ [https://perma.cc/WPG4-GZT7].
246. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Part I.C.3.
248. See Loren, supra note 108, at 705–06 (arguing that there could be more “pre-answer
dismissals in cases of clear fair use” if it were not treated as an affirmative defense because
the plaintiff’s claim would not be plausible).
249. See David M. Jacobson, The Plausibility Standard Under Twombly and Ashcroft,
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Summer 2009), http://files.dorsey.com/files/upload/
jacobson_wdtl_article.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWN6-H9J4] (“District courts now have
significant tools for enforcing Rule 12(b)(6), and defense counsel have a basis to litigate
motions to dismiss more aggressively.”).
250. When assessing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, that is, “[i]n
evaluating whether a claim has facial plausibility,” district court judges must still “construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Weiler v. Draper Chevrolet Co., No.
12-12402, 2013 WL 388585, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2013) (quoting Bassett v. NCAA, 528
F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)).
251. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156.
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neutralize the nonproducing entity’s one-sided economic incentive.252
Moreover, increasing the use and threat of Rule 11 sanctions would also deter
producing entities and individual owners from using nonproducing-entitylike tactics.253
3. Before Litigation
Under this proposal, potential secondary users will become aware of the
burdens facing plaintiffs who wish to bring infringement actions. Secondary
users with stronger fair use arguments will be less deterred by the threat of
liability because frivolous infringement actions will become less common.
For example, someone like John Else would actually be able to rely on fair
use.254 A culture which embraces fair use, and rejects enforcement in the
face of strong fair use, will cultivate more secondary uses. Finally, because
the initial fair use pleading burden would fall on producing and nonproducing
entities, such entities would be deterred from filing claims in cases with
stronger fair use arguments. Both types of entities should decide, when faced
with strong cases of fair use, that pursuing an enforcement action is not worth
it. Would-be secondary users should no longer have to choose between
creation or liability.255
CONCLUSION
This proposal neither attempts nor desires to change the analysis under the
fair use doctrine. This Note agrees with those who believe that the fair use
factors are the best way to produce determinations which are as close as
possible to an outcome based on the fairness contemplated by § 107. To
ensure that the fair use doctrine lives up to its full potential and purpose, it
should be applied as a right. Applying fair use as a right is also a long-term
solution to abusive copyright litigation. Under this proposal, stronger cases
of fair secondary uses can be decided earlier or never brought at all. As the
barriers to abusive copyright litigation increase, the incentives for abusive
copyright litigation will decrease.

252. See supra Part II.B.
253. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156.
254. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 98. Else said he “never had any doubt that it was ‘clearly
fair use’ in an absolute legal sense.” Id.
255. The public would no longer be faced with “the visible coercion that the copyright
holder may exert against them.” Sun, supra note 44, at 157–58.

